

Binary Rewriting without Control Flow Recovery*

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Abstract

Static binary rewriting has numerous applications in software security and systems—such as hardening, repair, patching, instrumentation and debugging. As such, many different static binary rewriting tools have been proposed over the decades. Since binary rewriting can insert/delete/move instructions, most existing tools attempt to recover control flow information from the input binary, and then use this information to adjust the set of jump targets in the rewritten binary. Given that the static recovery of control flow information is a hard problem in general, most existing tools use heuristics or simplifying assumptions about the input binary, such as specific compilers, source languages, etc. However, the reliance on assumptions is known to be fragile and tends not to scale in practice. For example, most existing tools cannot handle very large/complex programs such as web browsers.

In this paper we present E9PATCH, a tool that can statically rewrite x86_64 binaries without any knowledge of control flow information. To do so, E9PATCH develops a suite of binary rewriting methodologies, such as instruction punning and eviction, that can insert jumps to trampolines without the need to move other instructions. This preserves the set of jump targets and eliminates the need for control flow recovery and related heuristics. As such, E9PATCH is robust by design, and can scale to very large (>100MB) stripped binaries including web browsers such as Google Chrome and Firefox. We also evaluate the effectiveness of E9PATCH against realistic applications such as binary instrumentation, hardening and patching.

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1 Introduction

Static binary rewriting has many important applications in software security and systems, such as program hardening [7, 16, 41], automated repair [17, 32], instrumentation [27, 31] optimization [12, 34] and debugging [4, 29]. The advantage of binary rewriting is that it can be applied even when the source code of the software is unavailable, as is often the case with most *Commercial Off-The-Self* (COTS) software. The importance and usefulness of static binary rewriting has led to the development of multiple systems and tools [1, 5, 8, 18, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30, 33, 35–37, 39, 40] spanning many years. Most existing tools use a pipeline consisting of (1) a disassembler *frontend* that parses machine code instructions from the input binary, (2) a static *analysis* to recover control flow information (e.g., jump targets, basic blocks, function boundaries, etc.), (3) a *transformation* that inserts, deletes, replaces, or relocates binary code, and (4) a *backend* that emits the modified binary file. Since the binary rewriting process may move instructions, some form of control flow recovery is necessary in order to adjust the set of jump targets in the rewritten binary.

However, the accurate static analysis of binary code is notoriously difficult [24]. In the most general case, control flow information cannot be recovered statically. For example, an indirect jump may target an address that is only computed dynamically. Instead, most existing rewriting tools make simplifying assumptions about the binary code. For example, some tools assume that all indirect jumps follow a specific pattern (e.g., *jump tables* for C-style `switch` statements, etc.). However, this approach tends to scale poorly, as the underlying heuristics/assumptions typically break for large enough binaries [1]. For example, consider a static binary analysis for detecting indirect jump targets that is 99.9% accurate.

By modeling this value as a probability, the effective accuracy drops to $\sim 37\%$ per 1000 indirect jumps, and essentially drops to zero per 10000 indirect jumps. Such scales do exist in practice. For example, the Google Chrome [14] and Firefox [13] binaries contain over 25000 indirect jumps apiece. For this reason, the reliance on fragile assumptions/heuristics is recognised as a major problem for binary rewriting systems [1].

In this paper we introduce E9PATCH, a tool for static binary rewriting without the need for control flow recovery and associated assumptions/heuristics. The key idea behind E9PATCH is to exclusively use binary rewriting methodologies that are *control flow agnostic*, meaning that the set of jump targets from the input binary need not be known and will be preserved. For example, one such promising methodology is *instruction punning*—an idea previously used to implement dynamic instrumentation [6]. Here, given a set of *patch location instructions* P , instruction punning attempts to substitute each $I \in P$ with a *jump instruction* J that redirects control flow to a *trampoline* that implements some intended binary patch/instrumentation before returning control flow back to the main program. However, some instructions are smaller than jumps (five bytes for the x86_64) and cannot be substituted directly. To handle this case, instruction punning will specially engineer a “punned” jump whose byte representation is the same as that of any overlapping instruction. This “punned” jump can therefore safely substitute I without modifying or moving any other instruction. Crucially, the set of jump targets is also preserved, meaning that the instruction punning methodology is control flow agnostic.

Although promising, the applicability of instruction punning is dependant on the byte values of overlapping instructions. The resulting punned jump will sometimes target an invalid memory location and cannot be used. For this reason, instruction punning may suffer from poor *coverage*, meaning that only a subset of P can be patched. Boosting patching coverage is one of the key technical challenges for E9PATCH. To do so, we develop a suite of patching “tactics” that can be applied when instruction punning fails. For example, one key idea is *instruction eviction*, which changes the byte representation of overlapping instructions without changing the execution semantics. This may allow instruction punning to be applied to cases where it had previously failed. We show that our tactics can boost patching coverage to at or near 100% for many applications.

Another problem with instruction punning is that suitable trampoline locations are typically *constrained*. This may lead to high memory fragmentation and output file size bloat. To address this, we introduce a new space optimization—*physical page grouping*—that can significantly reduce physical memory usage (RAM, file size), sometimes by orders of magnitude. Furthermore, physical page grouping uses

memory-mapped executable code, allowing for physical memory resources to be shared by several instances of the same program.

In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:

- We adapt basic instruction punning to a static binary rewriting setting. However, instruction punning by itself does not provide sufficient coverage for most applications. For this, we develop several new patching tactics, such as *instruction eviction*, that are designed to boost patching coverage to at or near 100%.
- We present an optimization in the form of *physical page grouping*—a method for reducing physical memory usage while preserving memory-mapped executable code.
- We present E9PATCH, a powerful static binary rewriting tool designed to scale to very large binaries. To do so, E9PATCH only uses binary patching methodologies that preserve the set of jump targets, thereby eliminating the need for control flow recovery and associated heuristics.
- We evaluate E9PATCH against the SPEC2006 benchmark suite [15] and several large binaries. To demonstrate scalability, we also evaluate E9PATCH against web browsers such as Google Chrome [14] and Firefox [13], each with a binary size exceeding 100MB. We also consider two realistic applications in the form of binary patching and binary heap write hardening.

Open Source Release

<https://github.com/GJDuck/e9patch>

2 Overview and Background

Our aim is to statically rewrite large binaries (executables and libraries) while preserving correctness and reasonable performance. Although many static binary rewriting tools exist [38], most work by relocating code and updating the control flow (e.g., jump targets) in the modified binary—an approach known to scale poorly [1]. Instead, our approach is to design static binary rewriting methodologies that are control flow agnostic, meaning that the set of jump targets need not be known in order to correctly rewrite the binary. The key idea is to treat all instructions (I) as potential jump targets (whether they really are or not), and to preserve the program semantics should control flow happen to jump to I at runtime. To achieve this, we use a patching methodology that ensures that all instructions are either:

1. preserved;
2. replaced by an operationally equivalent instruction; or
3. replaced by an instruction that implements the desired *patch* or *instrumentation*.

Patching is strictly performed at the instruction level—a patch operation must not change the semantics of other (unpatched) instructions nor modify the set of jump targets. Furthermore, our approach must also reasonably balance performance, coverage and scalability.

2.1 Background

We briefly review existing x86_64 instruction patching methods (*B0/B1/B2*) that are also control flow agnostic.

2.1.1 Baseline *B0*: Signal Handlers. One old idea is to replace each patch location instruction with a single-byte x86_64 `int3` instruction. When executed, the `int3` instruction raises an interrupt which manifests as a `SIGTRAP` signal that is sent to the program. Next, a signal handler implements the patch. This approach is traditionally used by debuggers to implement *break points*. Although jump targets are preserved, the use of interrupts and signal handlers requires kernel/user mode context switching, and suffers from poor performance (sometimes by orders of magnitude).

2.1.2 Baseline *B1*: Jumps. Another old idea is to replace each patch location instruction with a *jump instruction* that redirects control flow to a *trampoline* that implements the patch. The trampoline can also execute (or emulate) the displaced instruction if necessary. Control flow is returned to the main program after the trampoline has finished executing. This approach is much faster than signal handlers, and is used by many existing binary instrumentation tools [5, 6, 18, 28].


For the x86_64, this approach can be implemented using the *relative near jump* (`jmpq rel32`) instruction. Here `rel32` is a 32bit signed integer that is added to the *program counter* (`%rip`) in order to implement the jump. The relative near jump instruction is five bytes long, including one byte for the *opcode* (`0xe9`) and four bytes for the `rel32` value. A patch location instruction that is greater-than-or-equal-to five bytes can be directly replaced, but complications arise when the patch location instruction is smaller than five bytes. One idea is to replace *more than one* instruction with a jump. However, this assumes that the successor instructions are themselves not jump targets, meaning that some control flow information must be known. This violates our assumption of control flow agnosticism, meaning that the generalized approach cannot be used.

2.1.3 Baseline *B2*: Instruction Punning. Another recent idea is to specially engineer jumps that can safely overlap with other instructions. This is known as *instruction punning*—an approach previously used by LiteInst [6] for dynamic instrumentation. The basic idea is to find a relative offset value (`rel32`) that *shares the same byte representation as any overlapping instruction*. The patch instruction can then be safely replaced with a relative near jump using this special `rel32` value. For example, consider the consecutive instructions:

```
mov %rax, (%rbx)    add $32, %rax
```

Suppose that we wish to patch the `mov` instruction which has a three-byte x86_64 machine-code representation. Using instruction punning, we can insert a five-byte relative

jump provided the last two bytes of the `rel32` value agrees with the first two bytes (`0x48 0x83`) of the overlapping `add` instruction:



Instruction punning allows jumps to replace instructions smaller than five bytes. However, the location of the trampoline is now *constrained* and cannot be placed at an arbitrary address. In the example above, the trampoline must be placed at the relative offset `rel32=0x83480000..0x8348ffff` (under the little endian byte ordering of the x84_64). This is not always possible, since the relative offset may correspond to a virtual address that is either occupied by another object (e.g., `.text`, `.data`, or an existing trampoline), or may point to an *invalid address* (e.g., `NULL` or underflow to the *negative addresses* range). In the example above, the `rel32` value will be interpreted as a *negative offset* since the *most significant bit* (MSB) is set. If the resulting address is negative it cannot be used as a trampoline location. As such, instruction punning can typically only cover a subset of all patch locations for most applications.

2.2 Our Approach

Although *B0* is control flow agnostic, it is far too slow for most applications. The combination of *B1* and *B2* improves performance, but only provides partial coverage of all patch locations (between 42–94% by our Section 6 experiments). Our approach is to design a new set of *patching tactics* that can similarly patch instructions without knowledge of control flow information. Thus, if *B1/B2* fail, we try new tactics *T1/T2/T3* based on combinations of instruction *padding*, *punning* and *eviction*. Each new tactic increases the probability that the patching operation succeeds. The final tactic (*T3*) is also designed to trade performance for coverage, and will likely succeed in cases where previous tactics have failed. We show that the combination of the baseline and proposed patching tactics leads to near perfect coverage for many real-world applications. We also implement our approach in the form of the `E9PATCH` static binary rewriting tool. Here, “E9” refers to the opcode of the x86_64 `jmpq` instruction that is fundamental to our approach.

Assumptions. No static binary rewriting tool is perfectly assumption-free. `E9PATCH` aims to minimize as many assumptions as is reasonably possible, including:

- `E9PATCH` does not assume that the input binary was compiled with a specific compiler or programming language;
- `E9PATCH` does not assume that symbol/debug information is available and works with *stripped* binaries;
- `E9PATCH` does not assume that control flow information is available or can be recovered.

- E9PATCH does not attempt to *symbolize* the binary.

That said, E9PATCH does make some minimal assumptions. For example, since E9PATCH modifies executable code (e.g., the `.text` section), there is an assumption that the patched instructions are not *read from* (as distinct from *executed*) or *written to* (self-modifying code). Like all binary rewriting systems, E9PATCH assumes the instrumentation/patch is *transparent*, meaning that the program behaviour is not changed unintentionally through some side channel (e.g., timings, file mappings, etc.). Finally, the current E9PATCH implementation assumes that the input binary itself does not already use overlapping/punned instructions. However, it may be possible to relax this assumption in future versions.

The E9PATCH tool does not use a built-in disassembler, and instead relies on instruction information (e.g., locations and sizes) to be passed in as input from a suitable frontend. The E9PATCH tool rewrites the binary assuming this information is correct. The motivation for this design is twofold. Firstly, our patching methodology is *local* meaning that it is possible to patch specific instructions without complete disassembly information being known. Secondly, binary disassembly is known to be a hard problem [35]. Since E9PATCH is low-level, it also retains flexibility, allowing for the integration with different disassembly techniques (partial, linear, recursive, superset [1], probabilistic [25], etc.). For the purpose of the evaluation in Section 6, we implemented a basic wrapper frontend that applies *linear disassembly* to the `.text` section of the input binary.

3 Patching Tactics and Strategies

The baseline instruction patching methodologies (*B1/B2*) do not provide sufficient coverage for most applications. In this section, we design a new set of tactics (*T1/T2/T3*) that (1) boost the coverage of instruction patching, and (2) do not require control flow information to work correctly. Here, we consider a working example based on the following instruction sequence:

```

Ins1: mov %rax, (%rbx)   Ins3: xor %rax, %rcx
Ins2: add $32, %rax      Ins4: cmpl $77, -4(%rbx)
    
```

The machine code and instruction layout is shown in Figure 1 (*Orig.*). We assume that the intended patch instruction is *Ins1* (highlighted). For the sake of example, we will assume that jumps to *negative relative offsets* (where the MSB of the *rel32* is set) are invalid. Thus, baseline instruction punning (Figure 1 line *B2*) yields an invalid trampoline location so cannot be used.

3.1 Tactic T1: Padded Jumps

The `x86_64` relative near jump is normally encoded in five bytes: one byte for the opcode and four bytes for the *rel32* offset. However, other encodings that use more bytes are possible. One idea is to *pad* the jump instruction with additional bytes in the form of *redundant instruction prefixes*.




Figure 1. Here *B2* is baseline instruction punning, tactic *T1* is *padded jumps*, tactic *T2* is *successor eviction*, and tactic *T3* is *neighbour eviction*. The patch location (*Ins1*) is highlighted in the (*Orig.*) instruction sequence. Here (`e9 + 4-bytes`) is a 32-bit relative near jump, (`eb + 1-byte`) is an 8-bit relative short jump, and (`XX/YY`) represent byte values chosen by the rewriting tool.

The `x86_64` supports multiple instruction prefixes (e.g., the REX prefix, segment overrides (`es`, `ss`, etc.), and operand override `0x66`) that do not change the semantics of the jump instruction.

Instruction padding is illustrated in Figure 1 lines *T1(a)* and *T1(b)*. Here, *T1(a)* uses a punned jump with a single byte of padding (using a redundant REX=`0x48` prefix), and *T1(b)* uses two bytes of padding (an additional redundant segment override prefix `es=0x26`). These prefix values do not change the semantics of the jump instruction. The more padding that is used the more constrained the relative offset becomes. For example, we have `rel32=0x83480000..0x8348ffff` for zero bytes of padding (*B2*), `rel32=0xc0834800..0xc08348ff` for one byte of padding (*T1(a)*), and `rel32=0x20c08348` for two bytes of padding (*T1(b)*). Assuming that negative offsets are invalid, only *T1(b)* yields a valid value.

Like baseline instruction punning (*B2*), tactic *T1* is control flow agnostic. However, the applicability of *T1* depends on the length of the patch instruction. For example, *T1* grants two additional patch attempts for the three-byte `mov` instruction from Figure 1, and this generalizes to one less than the length of the patch instruction for other cases. This also means that *T1* does not help single-byte patch instructions as there is no room for additional padding. When applicable, each subsequent pun attempt is more constrained than the

last. Nevertheless, even weakly constrained jumps may be invalid, as illustrated by $B2$ and $T1(a)$.

3.2 Tactic $T2$: Successor Eviction

Even padded jumps may fail to find a valid trampoline location, meaning that more aggressive patching tactics may need to be employed. One idea is to relax the preservation of the successor instruction bytes, provided that an operationally equivalent *replacement instruction* can be found. For this we introduce the notion of *instruction eviction*. Essentially, instruction eviction replaces a *victim instruction* I_{Victim} with a jump instruction to an *evictee trampoline*. The evictee trampoline does nothing other than to execute (or emulate) I_{Victim} before jumping back. Since the evicted instruction is replaced by a jump, the byte representation also changes. This makes it possible to find new puns where previous attempts failed.

Successor eviction is a two step process and is illustrated in Figure 1 $T2(a)$ and (b) . In the first step $T2(a)$, the successor instruction ($Ins2$) is evicted using tactic $B2$, and is replaced by a jump instruction to an evictee trampoline (at some offset between $0x48000000..0x48ffffff$). For the sake of example, we shall assume a valid evictee trampoline location can be found. In the second step $T2(b)$, we essentially “reapply” $B2/T1$ to $Ins1$. Since $Ins2$ has been replaced by a jump, its byte representation has also changed, allowing for new valid puns to be discovered where previously none were available.

As with $T1$, successor eviction is control flow agnostic. Although the victim instruction is replaced by a jump, the semantics of the instruction is unchanged and the set of jump targets is also preserved. Unlike $T1$, successor eviction can be applied to even single-byte instructions. That said, instruction eviction also introduces extra redirections to evictee trampolines, and this may translate into additional performance overheads. As such, successor eviction is only applied to cases where $B1/B2/T1$ failed to patch the instruction.

3.3 Tactic $T3$: Neighbour Eviction

If both $T1$ and $T2$ fail, another idea is to evict a “neighbouring” instruction rather than the successor. The space freed by the eviction can then be used to implement a “double” jump to the trampoline. This is the *neighbour eviction* tactic ($T3$).

Neighbour eviction requires an elaborate setup. First, a victim instruction I_{Victim} is chosen within the *unconditional short jump* distance of the patch instruction, i.e., within $-128..127$ bytes. Next, I_{Victim} is evicted, and replaced by two (possibly punned) relative jump instructions, \mathcal{J}_{Victim} and \mathcal{J}_{Patch} :

1. Jump \mathcal{J}_{Victim} redirects control flow from I_{Victim} 's location to I_{Victim} 's evictee trampoline. As with $T2$, this serves as a replacement of the victim instruction; and
2. Jump \mathcal{J}_{Patch} redirects control flow to the trampoline implementing the original patch.

Finally, the patch location instruction is replaced by an *unconditional short jump* \mathcal{J}_{Short} that redirects control flow to \mathcal{J}_{Patch} 's location. The patch trampoline can now be reached using a “double jump” ($\mathcal{J}_{Short} \rightarrow \mathcal{J}_{Patch} \rightarrow$ trampoline) all while preserving the semantics of the victim instruction I_{Victim} . Alternatively, the victim instruction itself may happen to be a patch location. In this case, \mathcal{J}_{Victim} will target I_{Victim} 's patch trampoline rather than an evictee trampoline.

Neighbour eviction is illustrated in Figure 1 $T3(a)(b)(c)$. In this example, instruction $Ins3$ has been chosen for eviction. In the general case, both $Ins2$ and $Ins4$ are also potential candidates. Step $T3(a)$ inserts a punned jump instruction (\mathcal{J}_{Patch}) inside victim $Ins3$ by overwriting the last byte. In the general case, jump \mathcal{J}_{Patch} may override any victim instruction byte except for the first. For the sake of example, we assume that the resulting offset $rel32=0x4dfc7d83$ points to a valid trampoline location. Next, step $T3(b)$ replaces the patch instruction with an *unconditional short jump* (opcode $0xeb$ + one byte relative offset $rel8=7$). This sets up the jump $\mathcal{J}_{Short} \rightarrow \mathcal{J}_{Patch}$. Finally, step $T3(c)$ replaces the victim instruction $Ins3$ by a jump \mathcal{J}_{Victim} to the evictee trampoline. Again, for the sake of example, we assume that offset $rel32=0x7b83e900..0x7b83e9ff$ points to at least one valid evictee trampoline location.

Neighbour eviction ($T3$) is complex yet powerful, and can often be applied even when the other tactics have failed. The key is the number of potential victim instructions. For example, if we assume an average instruction length of ~ 4 bytes, this translates into approximately 64 potential victims, meaning that at least one suitable victim is likely to be found. For this reason, neighbour eviction can boost patching coverage to at or near 100% for many applications. As with the other tactics, $T3$ is also control flow agnostic since all potential jump targets are either preserved, patched, or replaced by an operationally equivalent instruction. In terms of performance, the “double jump” of neighbour eviction introduces an extra level of indirection compared to tactics $T1$ and $T2$, and this can translate into additional runtime overheads. Accordingly, tactic $T3$ is only used as a last resort, and is only applied to cases where $B1/B2/T1/T2$ failed to patch the instruction.

Example 3.1 (Binary Patching). One application of E9PATCH is *binary patching* [32], i.e., fixing bugs at the binary-level rather than the source-code level. We consider a simple proof-of-concept case study based on the *use-after-free* vulnerability CVE-2019-18408¹. Figure 2(a) shows the developer source-level patch that we intend to apply at the binary level. For sake of example, we assume that the source code is unavailable, and that we choose to patch the first instruction (at address 422a61) after the call to `free`. All of $B1/B2/T1/T2$ fail to patch the instruction, meaning that $T3$ must be used. To apply $T3$, we must choose a victim instruction to evict, in this case the `testb` instruction at address 422ad1 (Figure 2(c)).

¹<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-18408>




Figure 2. Binary patching example to fix CVE-2019-18408 using $T3$. In sub-figure (c), the grey and underlined bytes are punned and shared by multiple instructions.

The `testb` instruction is replaced by two punned jumps: \mathcal{J}_{Victim} to the evictee trampoline of the evicted instruction (d), and \mathcal{J}_{Patch} to the trampoline implementing the patch (e). Finally, the original instruction at address 422a61 is replaced by a short jump \mathcal{J}_{Short} to \mathcal{J}_{Patch} .

The result is essentially spaghetti code with overlapping instructions. Nevertheless, the correct patch semantics have been implemented and the set of jump targets has been preserved. For example, a jump that targets 422ad1 will execute the evictee trampoline, thereby preserving the original semantics of the evicted instruction. This example also highlights the *locality* of our patching methodology. Only two instruction locations are modified, and only partial disassembly of the region around the patch location is required. □

3.4 Strategy S1: Reserve Order Patching

Tactics $B1/B2/T1/T2/T3$ can be used to patch individual instructions. However, many applications need to patch *multiple* instructions. Complications may arise if the patching tactics interfere with each other. For example, suppose that an application needs to patch *both* instructions $Ins1$ and $Ins2$ from Figure 1. If we patch $Ins1$ first using tactic $T1$, the relative offset ($rel32$) of the punned jump instruction will overlap with (and now depends on) $Ins2$'s specific byte values. Effectively, punning “locks-in” the byte values of any overlapping instruction. A similar problem exists for tactics $T2$ and $T3$.

To manage multiple patch locations we use a *reverse order patching* strategy ($S1$). The basic idea is to patch instructions in order of “highest to lowest” address, i.e., *reverse execution order*. This exploits the property that instruction punning only ever introduces dependencies with successor instructions. Thus, if we patch in reverse order, we only ever introduce dependencies on instructions that have already been patched. For example, the reverse order patching strategy will patch $Ins2$ first, modifying $Ins2$'s bytes, and possibly modifying/locking the bytes of $Ins3$ or $Ins4$ (depending on which patching tactic is applied). Only after $Ins2$ is patched do we attempt to patch $Ins1$. This time, patching $Ins1$ does not affect $Ins2$.

The reverse order patching strategy maintains a Boolean *lock state* of all relevant instruction bytes. Initially, all bytes are in the *unlocked* state. When a patching tactic is applied,

some bytes will be *locked* to disallow further modification. An instruction byte will be locked if one of the following conditions apply:

1. *Modified*: The byte value was overwritten.
2. *Punned*: The byte value was not overwritten, but is used as part of a punned jump instruction ($B2/T1/T2/T3$).

The highlighted bytes in Figure 1 will be locked after the application of the corresponding tactic. For example, in Figure 1 $T3$, bytes $\{0, 1, 7..13\}$ will be locked. Note that byte 2 (with value $0x03$) remains unlocked despite being part of the patch instruction, since this byte was neither modified nor used by a punned jump instruction. Byte 2 can be modified by the application of a future $T3$ patch operation. Tactics $T1$ - $T3$ are restricted to (1) only modify *unlocked* bytes, and (2) only lock bytes *after* the current patch location. This also restricts $T3$ short jump to positive offsets, effectively halving the number of potential eviction locations. However, we find that this restriction has a minimal impact in practice.

4 Memory and File Size Management

Tactics $B1/B2/T1/T2/T3$ insert jumps to trampolines that must be loaded into the patched program's virtual address space. In the case of instruction punning, the corresponding trampoline locations are *constrained* by the byte values of overlapping instructions. This may prevent trampolines from being packed contiguously, potentially leading to high fragmentation and poor memory utilization. Furthermore, in the context of static binary rewriting, the file size of the patched binary must also be considered. Normally, executable code is directly `mmap`'ed from the binary (i.e., *file-backed mapping*), allowing for multiple instances of the same program to share the same physical memory resources (RAM, disk). Naively applying file-backed mapping to fragmented memory can significantly bloat the size of the patched binary.

Memory fragmentation may be partly mitigated by “grouping” trampolines into the same virtual pages whenever possible—an idea first introduced by LiteInst [6]. For example, in Figure 1 $B2$, the trampoline can be placed at any relative offset within the range $rel32=0x83480000..0x8348ffff$. The trampoline can therefore be “grouped” with any other trampoline that happens to be placed within this range. That said, trampoline locations are often sufficiently constrained so as




Figure 3. Physical page grouping example. Here, approach (a) implements a naïve one-to-one mapping between physical $P(a)$ and virtual $V(a)$ pages. Approach (b) implements *physical page grouping* by mapping a single “merged” physical page $P(b)$ into the virtual address space $V(b)$ three times—effectively reducing physical memory usage by two thirds.

to prevent meaningful grouping. For example, only one exact relative offset $rel32=0x20c08348$ is valid for Figure 1 $T1(b)$. In the worst case there will be ~ 1 trampoline per virtual page, leading to a very poor virtual memory utilization (e.g., $\sim 2.8\%$ from [6]).

Physical Page Grouping. Despite the potential for high virtual memory fragmentation, it may still be possible to optimize the *physical* memory usage of the patched program. For this we introduce *physical page grouping*—a space optimization designed to merge and share physical memory resources. As a motivating example, we consider a patched program using five trampolines t_1 – t_5 spread over three virtual pages 1–3, as illustrated in Figure 3 $V(a)$. The memory between trampolines is not used, leading to poor virtual memory utilization. Furthermore, a naïve *one-to-one* mapping from physical $P(a)$ to virtual $V(a)$ memory will translate the problem into poor physical memory utilization. For example, in Figure 3 $P(a)$, a total of three (mostly empty) physical pages will be used. Assuming that $P(a)$ is file-backed, this also bloats the size of the patched binary file.

Physical page grouping aims to optimize physical memory utilization by merging pages with non-overlapping trampolines. These “merged” physical pages can then be `mmap`’ed to the same virtual address locations as the naïve approach, effectively implementing a *one-to-many* mapping. For example, the three physical pages from Figure 3 $P(a)$ can be merged into the single physical page from $P(b)$. This “merged” physical page can then be `mmap`’ed into the patched program’s virtual address space *three* times, as shown by $V(b)$. This places each trampoline t_1 – t_5 at the same virtual address as the naïve approach $V(a)$, but only uses a single physical page—effectively reducing physical memory usage by two thirds.

The main challenge for physical page grouping is to find sets of physical pages that can be merged. For this, our E9PATCH implementation divides the virtual address space

into a set of *blocks* B of M consecutive pages. Here, M is some predetermined granularity that controls the aggressiveness of the optimization, with $M=1$ being the most aggressive. Trampolines that span block boundaries are treated as two mini-trampolines in two different blocks. Next, a *partitioning algorithm* organizes the elements of B into a set of *groups* $G_B \subseteq \mathcal{P}(B)$ such that (1) each $b \in B$ appears in exactly one group, and (2) for all $grp \in G_B$ and for all $b_1, b_2 \in grp$, then the trampolines in b_1 and b_2 are disjoint relative to the respective block base. Each group can then be merged into a single physical block that is mapped into the patched program’s virtual address space multiple times. For the example in Figure 3, we use $M=1$ and the partitioning algorithm yields $G_B = \{\{page\ 1, page\ 2, page\ 3\}\}$. In general, partitioning is a *combinational optimization problem*, and many different partitioning algorithms are possible. For E9PATCH, we found that a simple greedy algorithm gives reasonable results for reasonable performance.

Physical page grouping has the side effect of loading trampolines into redundant locations. For example, all five trampolines t_1 – t_5 are loaded into each virtual page 1–3 from Figure 3 $V(b)$. However, these redundant locations remain unused, and do not affect the behaviour of the patched program. Another issue is that physical page grouping may generate large numbers of mappings. Depending on the application, this number may exceed the default mapping limit for Linux (`vm.max_map_count=65536`). One solution is to raise the mapping limit, however this requires privileged/root access and may not always be possible. Another solution is to use a *coarser granularity* $M > 1$ to reduce the number of mappings in exchange for increased physical memory usage. For $M \geq 64$, the number of mappings will always be below the default system limit for a single binary. The current E9PATCH implementation supports multiple granularities, allowing the user to tune the number of mappings (versus physical memory usage) accordingly.

5 Implementation

The E9PATCH tool takes as input an unpatched binary (executable or shared object), disassembly information (instruction locations and sizes), a set of *patch instruction locations*, and a set of *trampoline templates*. E9PATCH outputs a modified binary with one of $B1/B2/T1/T2/T3$ applied to each patch location instruction, thereby diverting control flow to a corresponding trampoline implementing the desired patch. E9PATCH is low-level by design, and can be used as the foundation for many different applications, such as binary patching, hardening and other instrumentation applications.

5.1 ELF Rewriting

The ELF file format is primarily designed to simplify linking and minimize loading time, rather than be a file format amenable to rewriting. Nevertheless, E9PATCH avoids many

of the complications of ELF rewriting by strictly patching existing segments *in place*. This means that data is never moved, and avoids the need to recompute offsets throughout the ELF file.

Some new data, such as executable trampoline and instrumentation segments, also needs to be added to the patched binary. To do this, E9PATCH appends the new data to the *end* of the file, also avoiding the need to move existing data. The new physical pages must also be mapped into the program’s virtual address space during program loading. To do so, E9PATCH integrates a small loader into the output binary. The loader replaces the entry point, and `mmaps` the trampoline/instrumentation pages into their correct positions before returning control flow to the “real” entry point. We now summarize some of the main features of the E9PATCH binary rewriter.

Position Independent Executables. E9PATCH can be applied to both *position independent executable* (PIE) and non-PIE code. Indeed, PIE binaries are becoming increasingly common in modern Linux distributions. The main motivation behind PIE is the security benefits offered by *address space randomization* (ASLR). Large security-sensitive programs, such as Google Chrome, are PIE by default.

Interestingly, PIE code is *easier* to patch than non-PIE code. This is because PIE code will be loaded into a high memory addresses by the dynamic linker—a safe distance from the invalid negative address range. Non-PIE code is typically loaded at a low fixed addresses chosen by the (static) linker. For example, `ld` chooses a low address (e.g., `0x400000`) by default, meaning that most negative offsets will be invalid. With PIE, the number of valid offsets for punned jump instructions effectively doubles. That said, it is important for static binary rewriting tools to support both PIE and non-PIE code. Non-PIE binaries will continue to be used into the foreseeable future.

Shared Objects/Libraries. E9PATCH can be applied to shared objects/libraries (e.g., `libc.so`) in addition to executables. Unlike PIE, we found that negative offsets are generally incompatible with the dynamic linker. This is because the dynamic linker tends to load other shared objects into this address range.

Mixing Patched/Non-Patched Code. E9PATCH does not move instructions, making it possible to safely mix patched and non-patched binary code without additional precautions. For example, the main executable may be patched but the library dependencies need not be, or vice versa. In contrast, most other binary rewriting tools work by moving instructions to new locations. This can create a problem if the non-patched code calls a pointer to a function that has been relocated, i.e., the *callback problem*. To solve the issue, these tools may require the entire dependency tree to be rewritten.

5.2 Limitations

The combination of tactics *T1–T3* can significantly boost patching coverage for many applications. However, perfect coverage is not guaranteed. This mostly occurs for hard cases, including:

- (L1) virtual address space shortages,
- (L2) single-byte instructions,
- (L3) attempting to patch many instructions.

A program that has very large code or data segments (L1) may limit the virtual address space available for trampolines [6]. Single-byte instructions cannot be patched using *T1*, and *T3* can only target a single (punned) short jump location, thereby limiting applicability (L2). For the `x86_64`, this mostly affects `ret`, `push` and `pop`, since most other common instructions are 2 bytes or larger. Finally, since patching tactics can be interdependent, attempting to patch all (or nearly all) instructions can cause interference and limit applicability (L3). Fortunately, (L1) does not apply to most programs, and (L2) and (L3) are irrelevant for many applications. For example, a binary hardening tool that instruments all pointer dereference instructions (≥ 2 bytes) will not be affected by (L2) nor (L3). Furthermore, (L3) is irrelevant for binary patching, one of the main application domains for E9PATCH.

Assuming that an instruction cannot be patched, the corrective action largely depends on the application. For example, binary hardening can usually tolerate some reduced coverage. For other applications that prioritize coverage over performance, using *B0* as a fallback may be appropriate.

6 Evaluation

In this section we evaluate the timing, coverage, file size and scalability of a prototype version of E9PATCH. We also present a practical application in the form of binary memory error detection using *low fat pointers* [10, 11].

6.1 Performance

To evaluate the performance of E9PATCH we use the full² SPEC2006 [15] benchmark suite, including programs implemented in C, C++, and Fortran. We compile each benchmark using the default system compiler (`gcc/g++/gfortran`). We also choose to compile in non-PIE mode in order to make patching more challenging. We also instrument several default binaries that were installed with Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS. For this, we choose binaries that were used in the preparation of this paper (such as `pdflatex`, etc.) as well as some prominent shared library dependencies. We have also tested E9PATCH on many other system binaries not included in Table 1, and all work as expected. Finally, to demonstrate scalability, we instrument some very large binaries such as Google Chrome [14] and FireFox (`libxul.so`) [13].

²Excluding `481.wrf` which failed to compile using modern `gfortran`.

Table 1. Patching Statistics. Binaries marked by (†) are *position independent executables* (PIE).

Binary	Size (MB)	Jmp/Jcc instructions (A1)								Heap write instructions (A2)							
		#Loc	Base%	T1%	T2%	T3%	Succ%	Time%	Size%	#Loc	Base%	T1%	T2%	T3%	Succ%	Time%	Size%
<i>perlbench</i>	1.25	36821	86.88	7.40	1.45	4.27	100.00	459.59	174.28	7522	71.16	24.42	1.18	3.23	100.00	244.90	116.66
<i>bzip2</i>	0.07	1484	79.85	13.61	2.22	4.31	100.00	280.85	199.45	1044	68.39	26.05	2.49	3.07	100.00	279.67	170.95
<i>gcc</i>	3.77	97901	85.66	8.29	1.62	4.43	100.00	364.41	164.50	14328	70.60	24.95	0.68	3.78	100.00	148.73	109.90
<i>bwaves</i>	0.08	314	71.34	2.87	0.32	25.48	100.00	107.08	137.01	1168	92.55	7.36	0.00	0.09	100.00	139.02	142.43
<i>gams</i>	12.22	125620	59.91	15.01	5.05	19.76	99.73	226.16	131.14	279592	87.58	9.65	0.50	2.20	99.94	321.89	136.93
<i>mcf</i>	0.02	295	68.47	20.00	4.41	7.12	100.00	194.92	203.75	220	75.91	20.00	1.36	2.73	100.00	141.02	221.51
<i>milc</i>	0.14	1940	80.62	13.40	1.29	4.69	100.00	115.03	157.13	699	84.84	13.16	0.29	1.72	100.00	117.54	119.14
<i>zeusmp</i>	0.52	3191	53.74	11.66	2.98	30.30	98.68	145.34	125.28	6106	82.61	12.15	0.39	4.67	99.82	131.50	128.74
<i>gromacs</i>	1.20	12058	80.19	11.49	1.38	6.94	100.00	116.16	133.01	16940	93.87	5.50	0.11	0.53	100.00	148.07	123.71
<i>cactusADM</i>	0.91	12847	78.94	13.32	2.30	5.44	100.00	101.43	140.70	5420	86.85	11.62	0.41	1.13	100.00	119.48	113.45
<i>leslie3d</i>	0.18	2584	44.43	27.67	12.46	15.44	100.00	151.89	174.56	2761	91.34	8.22	0.04	0.40	100.00	172.08	138.47
<i>namd</i>	0.33	4879	73.42	13.88	2.75	9.96	100.00	146.78	154.81	2498	71.46	28.14	0.20	0.20	100.00	138.01	120.42
<i>gobmk</i>	4.03	17912	75.88	14.72	2.57	6.83	100.00	368.97	113.80	2777	79.33	15.56	0.94	4.18	100.00	179.24	102.30
<i>deall</i>	4.20	61317	71.31	14.99	4.50	9.19	100.00	386.08	144.34	25590	80.47	17.83	0.17	1.52	99.99	168.86	112.27
<i>soplex</i>	0.49	10125	79.72	11.57	2.58	6.13	100.00	244.23	162.93	4188	83.05	15.28	0.53	1.15	100.00	162.98	121.64
<i>povray</i>	1.19	20520	86.92	7.39	1.49	4.20	100.00	408.33	146.34	9377	84.50	13.46	0.37	1.66	100.00	186.36	116.37
<i>calculix</i>	2.17	30343	70.48	17.75	2.89	8.88	100.00	132.78	141.24	32197	85.62	13.02	0.38	0.98	100.00	126.13	128.26
<i>hammer</i>	0.33	6748	77.71	13.96	1.99	6.34	100.00	182.94	174.52	3061	75.11	22.64	0.65	1.60	100.00	468.53	129.85
<i>sjeng</i>	0.16	3473	83.01	10.14	1.79	5.07	100.00	444.13	177.02	683	84.77	12.74	0.15	2.34	100.00	134.78	123.32
<i>GemsFDTD</i>	0.58	9120	41.62	17.28	21.44	19.66	100.00	104.78	166.74	10345	93.23	6.54	0.04	0.18	100.00	111.64	132.30
<i>libquantum</i>	0.05	732	75.55	15.85	3.42	5.19	100.00	325.81	190.57	186	76.34	17.74	0.00	5.91	100.00	269.68	139.82
<i>h264ref</i>	0.58	9920	80.30	13.58	1.22	4.90	100.00	206.61	151.60	4981	81.87	15.42	0.80	1.91	100.00	178.89	122.04
<i>tonto</i>	6.21	48247	52.65	22.84	8.63	15.88	100.00	196.21	125.54	164788	90.05	9.09	0.15	0.71	100.00	192.72	141.53
<i>lbm</i>	0.02	106	67.92	17.92	3.77	10.38	100.00	103.80	193.33	111	93.69	6.31	0.00	0.00	100.00	110.13	148.74
<i>omnetpp</i>	0.79	9568	78.08	13.96	2.16	5.79	100.00	203.90	135.45	5020	74.12	18.57	3.01	4.30	100.00	144.81	117.53
<i>astar</i>	0.05	769	78.54	13.78	2.21	5.46	100.00	287.64	180.98	491	72.91	23.01	0.61	3.46	100.00	137.64	152.03
<i>sphinx3</i>	0.21	3500	79.20	12.17	2.03	6.60	100.00	196.27	170.99	1159	73.94	22.95	0.78	2.33	100.00	129.17	123.55
<i>xalancbmk</i>	5.99	81285	75.66	14.10	3.50	6.74	100.00	474.07	137.04	32761	79.51	17.61	0.43	2.45	100.00	130.16	111.38
#Total/Avg%	47.74	613619	72.79	13.95	3.73	9.48	99.94	210.81	157.43	636013	81.63	15.68	0.60	2.09	99.99	164.71	130.90
<i>inkscape</i> [†] 0.91	15.44	195731	97.83	1.31	0.86	0.00	100.00	–	130.40	105431	99.96	0.03	0.01	0.00	100.00	–	109.58
<i>gimp</i> 2.8.16	5.75	71321	71.75	18.69	2.49	7.08	100.00	–	135.74	15730	84.83	12.59	0.64	1.95	100.00	–	106.00
<i>vim</i> [†] 7.4	2.44	72221	99.18	0.23	0.60	0.00	100.00	–	173.31	13279	99.92	0.02	0.06	0.00	100.00	–	110.77
<i>git</i> 2.7.4	1.87	44441	80.06	11.91	2.14	5.88	100.00	–	169.16	9072	68.06	27.62	1.16	3.16	100.00	–	113.60
<i>pdflatex</i> 2.6	0.91	22105	82.05	10.46	2.06	5.42	100.00	–	168.72	6060	70.61	24.97	1.25	3.17	100.00	–	118.70
<i>xterm</i> 322	0.54	11593	79.12	12.45	3.04	5.39	100.00	–	166.23	2681	89.11	9.40	0.41	1.08	100.00	–	113.16
<i>evince</i> [†] 3.18.2	0.42	3636	99.59	0.30	0.11	0.00	100.00	–	131.63	716	99.86	0.00	0.14	0.00	100.00	–	107.86
<i>make</i> 4.1	0.21	4807	79.34	12.96	1.71	5.99	100.00	–	182.78	1383	74.98	20.46	0.94	3.62	100.00	–	125.48
<i>libc.so</i> 2.23	1.87	52393	81.19	11.55	2.23	5.03	100.00	–	247.67	24686	74.32	21.98	1.05	2.64	100.00	–	203.87
<i>libc++.so</i> 6.0.21	1.57	20593	75.14	13.02	4.60	7.24	100.00	–	184.99	15442	67.56	27.76	0.99	3.68	100.00	–	168.80
<i>Chrome</i> [†] 78.0	152.51	3800565	93.20	4.68	1.87	0.25	100.00	–	226.31	2624800	99.38	0.49	0.11	0.01	100.00	–	197.68
<i>Firefox</i> [†] 70.0	0.52	13971	98.02	0.54	1.44	0.00	100.00	–	269.22	7355	99.90	0.10	0.00	0.00	100.00	–	208.06
<i>libxul.so</i> 70.0	115.03	1463369	68.55	15.08	5.26	11.10	99.99	–	194.55	666109	75.72	20.61	0.62	3.06	100.00	–	174.22

E9PATCH is a general binary rewriting tool that has many potential applications, such as binary repair, instrumentation and hardening. Typically, binary repair will focus on a few locations corresponding to bugs (e.g., see Example 3.1), whereas instrumentation/hardening will need to modify multiple locations. For this evaluation we focus on instrumentation as it is the more challenging application. Specifically, we choose two test applications (A1/A2) that instrument:

1. A1: All jmp/jcc jump instructions; and
2. A2: All instructions that may write to heap pointers.

The former is a rough analogue for basic-block counting which is a common benchmark for static binary rewriting tools. However, since E9PATCH does not have basic block information by design, we instrument jump instructions instead. The latter will be used for a hardening application presented in Section 6.3. For these experiments, we use an “empty” instrumentation that merely executes/emulates the displaced instruction before returning control flow back to the main program. This will demonstrate the baseline performance of E9PATCH’s patching methodology.

The patching statistics are shown in Table 1. Here, we instrument the (.text) section for each application. Column (Size) is the binary size in MB, (#Loc) is the number of patch locations, (Base%) is the percentage of successful patchings using baseline methods ($B1+B2$), ($T1/T2/T3\%$) is the percentage of successful patchings for each tactic, (Succ%) is the overall percentage of successful patchings ($B1+B2+T1+T2+T3$), (Time%) is the overall runtime performance overhead, and (Size%) is the overall output binary size over the original. For the latter, the *physical page grouping* optimization (Section 4) has been applied with a granularity of $M=1$ (i.e., maximum aggression). All experiments are run on a Xeon Silver 4114 Processor (2.20GHz with 32GB of RAM).

Coverage. Each patching tactic is not guaranteed to succeed, meaning that the *coverage* (i.e., the ratio of successfully patched instructions) is a concern. Despite this, the Table 1 results show that E9PATCH achieves very high coverage, and can patch nearly every benchmark with a 100.00% score. In total, E9PATCH patches $\sim 1.05 \times 10^7$ instructions while only 1098 fail. The exceptions are discussed below.

Table 1 also shows the relative coverage breakdown for each patching tactic $T1-T3$. Here, (Base%) represents the baseline coverage if $B1/B2$ are used in isolation. In this case, only 72.79% of all jump instructions and 81.63% of all heap write instructions will be patched. Each subsequent tactic, $T1-T3$, improves the coverage, allowing for more instructions to be successfully patched. Our results also highlight the importance of the *neighbour eviction* ($T3$) tactic. Without $T3$, the overall coverage would be merely $\sim 90.5\%$ (i.e., $Base+T1+T2$) for $A1$ rather than $\sim 100\%$. This is because $T3$ by itself has a high coverage, and can be used to patch instructions that could not be handled by other tactics.

The Table 1 results also highlight a clear difference between PIE and non-PIE binaries. Since PIE binaries allow trampolines to be placed in the negative address range, the probability that any given patching tactic succeeds is much higher. Even the baseline (Base%) for PIE binaries is $>93\%$. This result is important since PIE binaries are becoming increasingly common in modern Linux distributions thanks to the enhanced security benefits of address space randomization (ASLR).

Despite the overall success, some benchmarks, such as *gamess* and *zeusmp*, did not achieve 100% coverage. On closer examination, both of these programs statically allocate very large (.bss) sections. This limits the virtual address space available for trampolines, making instruction patching more difficult (see limitation (L1) from Section 5.2). Even under these conditions, E9PATCH can still patch $>98.5\%$ of all instructions. Most of the other tested binaries (including web browsers) do not make large static allocations, and are therefore not affected by (L1). Finally, we note that E9PATCH can patch 100% of all instructions when *gamess* and *zeusmp* are recompiled in PIE mode.




Figure 4. Relative E9PATCH runtime overheads of Chrome and FireFox using the Dromaeo DOM browser benchmarks.

File Size. Each patched instruction makes use of a trampoline that must be incorporated into the output binary. Since trampoline locations cannot be fully controlled, there is the potential for high address space fragmentation and file size bloat. With *physical page grouping* (Section 4) enabled, we see that the overall file size is more manageable at +57.43% for jump instructions ($A1$) and +30.90% for heap write instructions ($A2$). We also reran each benchmarks with physical page grouping disabled, i.e., by using a naïve one-to-one mapping between physical and virtual memory. In this case, the average file size balloons to +2239.83%/+568.96% for $A1/A2$ respectively. This highlights the importance of physical memory optimization when large numbers of instructions need to be patched.

Runtime Performance. To measure the performance, we run each of the SPEC2006 benchmarks and compare the overhead versus the original binary. We only measure the performance for SPEC since other programs do not have standard benchmarks. Furthermore, we will measure the performance for web browsers separately. Overall, we see that E9PATCH introduces a +110.81% overhead for jump instructions ($A1$), and a +64.71% overhead for heap write instructions ($A2$).

To maximize scalability, E9PATCH avoids relocating binary code and preserves the set of jump targets. In contrast, other static binary rewriting tools aggressively relocate code, allowing for patch/instrumentation code to be *inlined* rather than jumping to/from trampolines. This approach generally gives better performance assuming that the binary can be rewritten correctly. For example, there is a +60.48% overhead for MULTIVERSE [1] (empty instrumentation), a +62% overhead for PEBIL [18] (basic block counting), and a $\sim 70\%$ overhead for DynInst [2] (basic block counting). Compared to inlined instrumentation, our approach executes (at least) two additional instructions ($2 \times \text{jmpq}$) which adds additional overheads. The trade-off is a robust design that does not need control flow information, allowing E9PATCH to scale to very large binaries.

Language Agnosticism. For the evaluation, we tested programs compiled from (combinations of) C, C++, Fortran and (inlined) assembly. Because E9PATCH is very low-level, it is




Figure 5. SPEC206 and web browser timings for heap writes (Table 1/Figure 4) and LowFat instrumentation.

also language agnostic by design, meaning that it is able to instrument/patch programs compiled from a variety of programming languages. In contrast, some existing binary rewriting tools, such as PEBIL [18], incorporate compiler or language-specific assumptions in order to implement control flow recovery. Such assumptions may fail when applied to binaries compiled from other languages.

6.2 Scalability: Chrome and FireFox

One of the core aims of E9PATCH is to scale to very large binaries. To evaluate scalability, we use E9PATCH to instrument web browsers such as Google Chrome [14] and FireFox [13]. Each browser has a binary size exceeding 100MB—an order of magnitude larger than the largest SPEC benchmark (games). We found that the Chrome (.text) section contains a mixture of data and code, which proved to be a challenge for our prototype linear disassembler frontend. To work around the issue, we only disassemble after the ChromeMain symbol (which still represents >97.5% of the .text section). FireFox also arranges its binaries differently, with the bulk of the code placed into a shared object (libxul.so), which is patched using E9PATCH. To measure the performance, we use the Dromaeo Document Object Model DOM browser benchmarks [9]. We choose these benchmarks to minimize the execution time spent in *Just-in-Time* (JIT) compiled Javascript code. For this experiment we instrument the *heap write instructions* application (A2), and the instrumentation statistics are shown in Table 1.

The results are shown in Figure 4. Overall, we see that E9PATCH introduces a ~113% overhead for Chrome and a ~46% for FireFox. These results are consistent with the performance measurements for the SPEC benchmarks. FireFox seems to be less sensitive to the E9PATCH instrumentation compared to Chrome, possibly because FireFox spends more time in in JIT’ed code or in non-instrumented shared objects. Regardless, our results show that E9PATCH is able to scale to very large binaries such as web browsers.

6.3 Application: Binary Heap Write Hardening

As a proof-of-concept demonstration application, we choose to harden binaries against heap pointer spatial memory errors (e.g., buffer overflows). We do not instrument reads, since out-of-bound reads are not necessarily errors at the binary level [4]. We instrument all pointer write instructions excluding registers %rsp (stack) and %rip (globals). To detect spatial memory errors, we use a variant of *low fat pointers* [10, 11]—a method for encoding bounds information (i.e., base+size) into the bit representation of the object pointer itself. Low fat pointers can be used to enforce *redzones* by ensuring that the property $(p - base(p) \geq 16)$ holds for all pointer writes. Here, p is the written-to pointer, $base(p)$ is the low fat pointer operation that retrieves the object base address [10], and 16 is the size of the *redzone* in bytes. Pointer p is calculated by converting the patch location instruction into an x86_64 *load effective address* (lea). Next, p is passed to a *redzone-check function* that is called by each trampoline. Finally, the standard libc memory allocation functions (malloc, calloc, etc.) are replaced by LD_PRELOAD’ing a low fat runtime library (liblowfat.so) [20]. The library has also been modified to insert redzones around each allocated object.

The results are shown in Figure 5. Here we compare against the empty instrumentation of Table 1. For the SPEC benchmarks, the overall overhead increases from +64.71% (A2) to +127.27% for heap write bounds checking. For the browsers Chrome/FireFox, the overall overhead increases from +113%/+46% to +170%/+60% respectively. Higher overheads are to be expected since bounds checking executes more instructions. The overhead for source-level instrumentation can be lower, sometimes as little as +13% [10]. However, source-level instrumentation can be inlined and optimized by the compiler, something that is difficult to replicate at the binary level. Furthermore, the source-level implementation of LowFat [20] only supports C/C++, whereas E9PATCH works at the binary level and does not assume source code availability.

7 Related Work

We briefly review the related work and compare against E9PATCH. See [38] for a recent survey.

Static Rewriting Tools. Many different static binary rewriting systems and tools have been proposed. Some tools, such as Vulcan [33], Alto [26], PittSfield [22], Google’s Native Client [39], SASI [12], PEBIL [18], and Diablo [8], assume that the input binary was produced by a specific/specialized compiler or that symbol/debug information has been preserved (i.e., *non-stripped*). Unlike E9PATCH, these tools do not work on binaries that break these assumptions. Other static binary rewriters, such as (static) DynInst [5], BIRD [28], and PSI [40], attempt to relax these assumptions in exchange for better compatibility. To do so, these tools typically implement some combination of (1) signal handlers (e.g., SIGTRAP), (2) non-punned jumps replacing one or more instruction, or (3) global binary rewriting that inlines instrumentation as necessary. Signal handlers are generally too slow for most applications, and the alternatives require control flow information in order to safely rewrite the binary. Static control flow recovery relies on assumptions/heuristics that are known not to scale [1]. Alternatively, control flow information can be recovered dynamically by the rewritten binary, e.g., by using the *address translation* approach from PSI [40]. However, this requires a global rewriting of all indirect jumps—including the entire shared library dependency tree. In contrast, E9PATCH uses a *local* binary rewriting methodology that is applicable to individual binaries, requires only partial disassembly information, and preserves the set of jump targets—thereby eliminating the need for control flow recovery (of any kind).

Alternative tools such as SecondWrite [30] and McSema [23] attempt to lift binary code into the LLVM *Intermediate Representation* [19] that can be recompiled into a new binary. Similarly, tools such as UROBOROS [35, 36] and RetroWrite [31] attempt to *disassemble* binaries into a form amenable to *reassembly*, possibly after modification. To work correctly, these tools make several assumptions about the input binary, such as assuming specific languages (e.g., C for UROBOROS/RetroWrite) or *position independent code* (RetroWrite). In contrast, E9PATCH can statically rewrite binaries without making such assumptions. Similarly, MULITVERSE [1] also aims to minimize assumptions by using a “brute force” disassembly over all possible offsets. However, MULITVERSE also implements a global rewriting approach that inherits the limitations described above, such as requiring that all shared library dependencies be rewritten.

Dynamic Rewriting/Instrumentation Tools. An alternative to static is *dynamic rewriting*, which patches binary code at runtime as the program executes. Dynamic rewriting can be scalable since dynamic analysis tends to be accurate whereas static analysis tends to be approximate. While static rewriting can be done offline (rewrite once, execute many times),

dynamic rewriting is done online, and this can add additional runtime performance overheads. Pin [21] and DynamoRIO [3] dynamically analyze and instrument programs using a callback mechanism. These tools use *just-in-time* (JIT) recompilation of instrumented functions and basic blocks “on-the-fly”. This requires a complex infrastructure, and the program is JIT’ed rather than run “natively”. As such, these tools are generally too heavyweight for some applications such as binary patching. The DynInst [5] framework also supports dynamic instrumentation using a similar methodology to that of the static case.

LiteInst [6] originally proposed instruction punning for dynamic instrumentation rather than static binary rewriting. Like E9PATCH, LiteInst uses alternative tactics should instruction punning (*B2*) fail:

- Instrument a previous instruction; or
- Replace overlapping instructions with illegal opcodes.

The former requires control flow information in order to ensure that the instrumentation is called (the previous instruction in memory is not necessarily the last executed), and the latter requires control flow information to avoid expensive signal handlers. Since E9PATCH does not assume control flow information, neither are appropriate for our setting. Finally, since static rewriting is offline, E9PATCH can apply more aggressive optimizations such as physical page grouping.

8 Conclusion

In this paper we presented E9PATCH, a powerful and scalable static binary rewriting tool. The key idea is to exclusively use rewriting methodologies—such as instruction *punning* and *eviction*—that can safely patch x86_64 instructions without the need for (or knowledge of) control flow information (jump targets, basic blocks, function boundaries, etc.). This means that E9PATCH can statically rewrite binaries without the need for control flow recovery analysis and the corresponding (fragile) assumptions/heuristics. As such, E9PATCH is very robust, and is able to scale to very large binaries (including web browsers such as Firefox [13] and Chrome [14]), all while maintaining reasonable performance and memory overheads.

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